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Abstract:
This paper investigates how individuals reason about the authenticity of the news content they consume. While
researchers have conducted much work on fake news detection and prevention, we know relatively less about how
news readers reason about the content that they read. Using data collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk, we
analyzed over 1,000 justifications that news readers provided about why they believe (or fail to believe) given news
articles. We included both fake and credible articles in our analyses and examined the novelty of the news topic as a
possible contingency factor that differentiated the reasoning provided. Based on our psycholinguistic analyses, we found
that news readers employ both cognitive and motivated reasoning and that agreement with the ground truth impacts
the reasoning more than a news topic’s novelty. Our insights contribute to the literature on news consumption and
reasoning in the context of evaluating fake news. Furthermore, this knowledge contribution has implications in areas
such as news veracity intervention and tool design. Lastly, we offer a methodological contribution via using linguistic
analysis in a novel way to assess the quality of open-ended survey questions.
Keywords: Fake News, Reasoning, Natural Language Processing, Crowdsourcing.
Shuk Ying (Susanna) Ho was the accepting senior editor for this paper.
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Introduction

Fake news refers to news stories that contain fabricated content and that lack verifiable facts and/or sources
(Tandoc et al., 2018; Wardle, 2017) to support them. Fake news has existed for a while but has gained
more attention in recent years due to its negative impact on society and the rise of social media and alternate
news distribution channels. Since these channels can publish content faster compared to traditional news
media, many actors have a strong interest in preventing fake news from spreading. As Zhou et al. (2019)
noted, fake news has weakened the public trust in governments and impacted significant events such as
the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Fake news also impacts non-political
domains such as stock markets and trade deals (Clarke et al., 2020; Kogan et al., 2019). Research on social
media shows that, on platforms such as Twitter, fake news spreads far more rapidly than genuine or truthful
news (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Motives across these alternate information sources range from profit to
political and inevitably lead to increasingly available misleading and false information.
Multiple research efforts have focused on combating fake news through detecting false information and
mitigating its spread. Some existing approaches have relied on fact checking (manual or automated, such
as https://fullfact.org/), style (using different visual, semantic, and syntactic post features) (e.g., Wang, 2017;
Ruchansky et al., 2017), and propagation (such as how news disseminates) (e.g., Braun & Eklund, 2019;
Gruppi et al., 2021b; Starbird et al., 2018). Researchers have paid less attention to the other side of the
equation; that is, how the people who read (and often accept) fake news interpret fake news and how they
might respond to the interventions mentioned above. Nevertheless, we need to understand this aspect for
two main reasons.
First, it entails important user information on how to design more effective interventions that target the heart
of fake news beliefs. Multiple studies have found resistance to false information interventions and “after-thefact" interventions (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019). For example, experiments with after-the-fact
interventions have resulted in interventions that have found mixed initial success (Horne et al., 2019) or,
even when initially successful, interventions that become ineffective in the long term (often called the
continued influence effect) (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Hence, current intervention designs likely have
inadequacies overall (Chan et al., 2017). By adding to our knowledge about how news customers reason,
one might design these after-the-fact interventions more effectively.
Second, understanding people’s reasoning can provide insight on how and why they share fake news and
how it propagates across societal layers. Research on fake news spread shows that false information can
propagate across platforms in two ways: 1) through malicious, intentional disinformation campaigns that
often involve political elites and automated bots (Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Broniatowski et al., 2018) and 2)
through real news consumers sharing false content for various reasons (e.g., trust the information source
and social media fatigue) (Talwar et al. 2019). Studies that elicit these rationales have focused on reasons
for sharing rather than reasons for believing, which often (though not always) (Lazer et al., 2021) constitutes
a precursor to sharing. Our study provides insights to the latter.
Previous work that has focused on the reasoning for believing fake news has looked at different informationprocessing paths. For example, Kahan (2013) examined how heuristic-driven reasoning, ideologically
motivated reasoning, and cognitive reasoning impact people’s willingness to accept views different from
their own in the political context. He concluded that ideological motivation plays a role in information
processing in such a context, a similar conclusion to what Thaler (2019) made. In contrast, Pennycook and
Rand (2019) contrasted news readers’ use of classical analytical reasoning (where belief in fake news has
roots in an inability to elaborate on the news content) versus ideologically motivated reasoning (where belief
in fake news has roots in prior (usually partisan) beliefs and biases). They found that people tend to believe
fake news due to the former (laziness) and not the latter (partisanship) (Pennycook & Rand, 2019, 2021).
In related literature, Moravec et al. (2018) found that the existence of fake news interventions (such as fake
news flags) can lead readers to elaborate and reason about the actual news content. However, when such
elaboration occurs, motivated reasoning (in the form of confirmation bias) may take over and override the
advice that the fake news flag provides.
The above work demonstrates that both low cognitive (analytical) reasoning and ideologically motivated
reasoning may explain why people believe fake news. In this paper, we extend this line of work but add
more nuance to it by considering news topic novelty. Novelty refers to the extent to which incoming
information is similar to prior knowledge (Karkali et al., 2013; Vosoughi et al., 2018) and can represent news
readers’ familiarity with the subject matter. Research shows that novel news situations can become a hot
bed for conspiracy theories and false content (Starbird et al., 2014); thus, we need to understand them
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better. We believe that news topic novelty might explain some discrepant findings about the role that
analytical and ideologically motivated reasoning plays in fake news. Further, novel news situation can lead
to information overload in which case people act irrationally and are more vulnerable to misleading
information, which makes it difficult for them to differentiate fake and trustworthy news (Shao et al., 2017).
Based on the above information, we focus on understanding differences in how people reason about content
in common (or everyday) versus novel (or emerging) news articles that they read and whether they employ
different reasoning for fake versus credible news under each condition. Specifically, we address this
question through an exploratory characterization of linguistic cues that news readers express when they
evaluate news articles. To this end, we asked individuals to read and evaluate news articles, some false
some not, and to comment on the extent to which they believed (or did not believed) the article and why.
We then used their justifications to investigate how they reasoned about the articles using investigative
linguistic cues such as grammatical tones, sentiment polarities, and emotions. We conducted our
examination in two specific news contexts: 1) one that involved common news (specifically, climate change
and general vaccinations before the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic) and 2) one that
involved novel news (specifically, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic).
Our work offers several contributions. First, we identify the reasoning processes that news readers employ
under different settings. We show that news readers use both cognitive and motivated reasoning but the
reasoning processes differ for novel versus common news topics. Further, we found that respondents’
agreement with the ground truth plays a role in the reasoning they provide. Second, from a methodological
perspective, we employ several innovative natural language processing approaches to learn about
individuals’ behavior through their written responses. Third, we offer some advice to designers about
designing technology interventions to minimize the extent to which fake news spreads while using these
language processing approaches. We link our findings to the existing literature on motivated reasoning in
the context of evaluating fake news articles and we add the use of social reasoning, when readers follow
the opinions of significant others. Our contributions also include a quantitative approach to incorporating
machine learning techniques that one could extend to a large-scale data analysis compared to traditional
surveys and questionnaires.

2
2.1

Literature Review
Current Approaches to Detect and Mitigate Fake News

Researchers have extensively studied fake news detection in recent years, mostly with help from automated
tools. We can broadly categorize studies on fake news detection into studies that use claim-level methods
(e.g., Ciampaglia et al., 2015; Hassan et al., 2017; Popat et al., 2016), article-level methods (e.g., Potthast
et al., 2017; Horne et al., 2018), and source-level methods (e.g., Horne et al., 2019; Baly et al., 2018;
Starbird et al., 2018). The features that these methods employ to detect fake news closely mirror the tactics
that have been used to lure people into reading and engaging with fake news. For example, studies have
shown that content with moral-emotional language spreads much further than content without it by a factor
of 20 percent per additional moral-emotional word (Brady et al., 2017); subsequently, the presence of moralemotional language can indicate low content veracity. Similarly, false news articles often have longer
headlines, which contain complete claims, which can allow readers to form false beliefs by reading news
headlines alone (Horne et al., 2017). A related phenomenon called “clickbait” instead adopts a different
headline structure that entices the consumer to click on the article link for more information in order to garner
advertising revenue. While clickbait articles do not constitute misinformation themselves, many low veracity
sources may rely on them (Shu et al., 2017; Chakraborty et al., 2016). Hence, the length and structure of
the headline is another feature that one can use to assess news’ veracity.
Researchers have also intensely studied methods to intervene in misinformation consumption
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). One of the most effective methods involves increasing readers’ news and
media literacy (Craft et al., 2017; Guess et al., 2020; Jones-Jang et al., 2021). Despite variations in
approach, researchers usually focus on providing readers with skills to assess information’s accuracy (Maksl
et al., 2017) either through in-depth information processing or by invoking helpful heuristics (Horne et al.,
2020). Heuristics constitute useful rules of thumb for forming a judgment (Colman, 2015)—mental shortcuts
to ease the cognitive load on decision makers (Myers & Dewall, 2018). Another method called prebunking
provides corrections to misinformation that one can anticipate in advance. Brashier and Schacter (2020)
found a related approach, debunking (providing corrections to misinformation), more effective than
prebunking (Brashier & Schacter, 2020). However, a correction may leave an inconsistency in one’s memory
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or may cause a person to remember incorrect information better than the correction (Lewandowsky et al.,
2012). Correcting misinformation that distorts the truth is especially difficult and requires significant mental
effort from readers (Lewandowsky et al., 2017) and trust in the entities providing the correction. Another
popular approach involves providing simple labels to alert users about problematic content or sources rather
than detailed fact-checking statements (Horne et al., 2019, 2020; Sathe et al., 2020; Spezzano et al., 2021).
Prior work has shown that AI-assisted labels for information accuracy are most helpful with explanations,
but such feedback is not uniformly helpful for all users (Horne et al., 2019). Finally, other efforts have also
concentrated on filtering or demoting problematic content or highly influential users as a problem’s scale or
urgency may necessitate it, especially in networked settings in the presence of bots or other informationmanipulation tactics (Bak-Coleman et al., 2021).
While these interventions constitute important tools in the misinformation toolbox to help readers better
calibrate their trust for the information that they encounter, they do not shed light on how readers consume
and interpret fake news and, consequently, how they might respond to the different interventions.

2.2

The News Readers’ Perspective

From the news consumer side, studies propose that people fail to make a distinction between true and false
news headlines when they rely on their intuition and do not deliberate (Bago et al., 2020). Research
suggests that people often accept fake news because they rely on peripheral cues. For instance, Kiely and
Robertson (2016) found that individuals rely on elites’ opinions to form opinions about a specific issue, a
tactic that fake news often employs. Sundar et al. (2003) conducted an experiment that looked at political
campaign websites design and found some evidence that users evaluate misinformation not just based on
the content itself but also based on other contextual aspects such as its “look” and features. Fazio (2020)
showed that mere exposure to a fake news headline would increase belief in that headline later. Related
work from Pennycook and Rand (2019, 2021) suggests that lazy thinking and low cognitive reasoning drives
susceptibility to fake news. In a similar study, Pennycook et al. (2015) found that people who more deeply
reflected on fake news statements were more likely to reject them as true, but individuals with less critical
reflection capacities accepted them more.
In contrast, other work shows that deliberation might actually cause people to fall for fake news under
specific contexts (e.g., Kahan, 2013; Moravec et al., 2018). Bago et al. (2020) and Pennycook and Rand
(2020) call this phenomenon “identity-protective cognition” and argue that people use it to rationalize content
that concurs with their political ideology. These arguments also concur with the broader literature on
confirmation bias, which means seeking or interpreting evidence in ways that agree with existing beliefs and
expectations (Nickerson, 1998), especially when people have confidence in their knowledge and its
correctness (Koriat et al., 1980). Due to confirmation bias, people consider new information that supports
their pre-existing views and ignore information that challenges those views (Moravec et al., 2018;
Lewandowsky et al., 2012). In some cases, even when one explicitly tells people that information is false,
they remain prone to accepting it, which might cause people to develop even more ingrained beliefs (Shu
et al., 2017; Vosoughi et al., 2018). Indeed, recent research found that social media users were more likely
to believe, like, and share articles that matched their point of view (Kim et al., 2018), which, in turn, can
propagate a broad belief in fake news (Vicario et al., 2019).
An interesting gap in the above literature concerns the contingencies under which cognitive reasoning takes
over ideologically motivated reasoning. With prior findings supporting both information processing
approaches, we need to study when one might take over the other. Kahan (2013) and Thaler (2019)
proposed one such contingency as being political affiliation. Kahan (2013) showed that conservatives exhibit
stronger ideologically motivated reasoning. Meanwhile, Brashier and Schacter (2020) found that age might
also play a factor. Specifically, they found that older adults might be especially susceptible to fake news,
but they argued that, although older adults forget where they learned information, fluency remains intact,
and knowledge accumulated across decades helps them evaluate claims. Related to this finding, Lazer et
al. (2021) paradoxically found that, while older people shared more misinformation on social media than
younger people, older people had a lower inclination to believe it.
In this paper, we explore a different contingency: a news topic’s novelty. To understand such novelty, we
borrow from the literature on information novelty. Several factors characterize information novelty: its
diversity or variation from previous information, non-redundant information volume, and its uniqueness (Aral
& Dhillon, 2022). Itti and Baldi (2009) provide a Bayesian definition for surprising information and measure
it by the extent to which it changes the receiver’s posterior beliefs. Novelty attracts human attention and
encourages information sharing because it updates how one understands the world (Vosoughi et al., 2018).
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Thaler (2019) argues that novelty induces motivated reasoning. At the same time, novelty often introduces
uncertainty, which researchers have shown to increase reliance on systematic cognitive reasoning (Tiedens
& Linton, 2001). Hence, the effect that news topic novelty has on the reasoning that news readers employ
can benefit from future research (Horne et al., 2020).
To better understand the effect that news topic novelty has on news consumption and veracity judgments,
we conducted an exploratory study in which we applied linguistic analysis to justifications that news readers
provided about the degree to which they accepted false and credible news articles. Although we focused
on specific conditions (false vs. true and novel vs. common), we used an open-ended dependent variable
that focused on the reasoning that respondents provided. For this reason, we opted for an exploratory study
as we describe in Section 3.

3

Empirical Study

In our empirical study, we tasked respondents with reading one randomly assigned article from our predefined article set that contained both false and credible news and both common and novel news topics.
After the respondents read the article, we asked them whether or not they believed it and why. Our main
data analysis (i.e., our linguistic analysis) focused on the reasoning that the respondents provided. Linguistic
analysis has become an increasingly popular approach in social science research. The analysis often uses
textual features, which include several lexicon, syntax, discourse, and semantics aspects. As linguists define
it, a lexicon refers to an entity’s (here, written assessments of news articles) vocabulary. At the lexicon level,
the main tasks involve measuring different frequency statistics, which one can do with approaches such as
a bag of words model or a unigram-bigram model (Jin et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2020). For syntax, one
explores the frequency with which different parts of speech appear in text to measure low-level syntax
operations and probabilistic context-free grammar parse trees for deep syntax operations (Conroy et al.,
2015; Feng et al., 2012; Pérez-Rosas et al., 2017). At the semantic level, one can assign different
frequencies to lexicons or phrases that fall into different psycho-linguistic categories that one can leverage
with Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Bond et al., 2017; Jordan et al., 2018).
We conducted the study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT), a commonly used platform for data
collection. Although AMT might not always be the most fitting platform, studies show that one can suitably
use it in settings that involve open-ended subjective assessments and that it generates quality data (Bates
& Lanza, 2013). Given that cultural differences may impact our finding, especially given our news context,
we limited responses to workers from only the United States. To ensure quality responses, we also limited
the human intelligence task (HIT) approval rate (a common quality measure on AMT) to 99 percent. We
collected the data in several rounds beginning in November, 2019 and ending in April, 2020. We received
1,212 usable responses in total.

3.1

Selection of Articles and Ground Truth

Table 1 presents information on the 19 articles that we used in this study (their source, headline, and ground
truth). These articles spanned three broad topics: climate change, vaccinations (before COVID-19), and
COVID-19. We classified the first two topics as common news since they have been around for quite some
time. We classified the third as novel. Recall that we collected data between November, 2019, and April,
2020, just as the COVID-19 pandemic began.
The last column in Table 1 shows the ground truth that we assigned to each article. In selecting articles that
varied in the ground truth, we used third-party organizations, similar to what previous studies have done
(Nørregaard et al., 2019; Gruppi et al., 2021a). Since our study involved participants reading individual news
articles, our ground truth also needed to be at the article level. To this end, we used a three-step process in
which we 1) found sources that Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC) labeled as reliable and unreliable, 2) found
topic specific articles from those sources (climate change, vaccination, and COVID-19), 3) selected articles
a third-party journalistic organization, such as Snopes, PolitiFact, FactCheck.org, Washington Post Fact
Check, or AP Fact Check, fact-checked.
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Table 1. News Articles that We Randomly Assigned to Respondents
Common news
Source

Title

Ground Truth

Natural News

Climate change HOAX has literally convinced a member of Congress that “the
world is going to end in 12 years”

Not credible

Freedom Bunker

Fight illness with this ancient immune booster

Not credible

Jew World Order

Greenpeace founder: global warming is a hoax pushed by corrupt scientists
“hooked on government grants”

Not credible

The Gateway
Pundit

NOAA ruins assertions by unhinged democrats that global warming has
caused increase in hurricane activity

Not credible

Natural News

World Health Organization declares anti-vax movement to be a top “global
health threat” just like the climate change hoax… the vaccine deep state
grows desperate

Not credible

BBC

“Completely avoidable” measles outbreak hits 25-year high in US

Credible

NPR

Climate change was the engine that powered Hurricane Maria’s devastating
rains

Credible

Chicago-Sun
Times

Kentucky governor exposed his kids to chickenpox instead of getting vaccine

Credible

NPR

New U.S. measles cases break 25-year-old record, health officials say

Credible

Fortune

U.S. carbon emissions soared in 2018. Here’s why

Credible

Novel News
Source

Title

Ground truth

The New York
Times

Open windows. Don’t share food. Here’s the government’s coronavirus
advice.

Credible

Reuters

World faces chronic shortage of coronavirus protective equipment: WHO

Credible

The Guardian

Can a face mask stop coronavirus? Covid-19 facts checked

Credible

Breitbart

Hillary Clinton falsely claims to Jimmy Fallon that Trump called coronavirus
outbreak “a hoax”

Not credible

Natural News

Vitamin C infusions being studied in China as possible treatment for
coronavirus-related pneumonia

Not credible

Natural News

Spirulina found to boost the body’s type 1 interferon response to fight RNA
viral infections “including coronavirus”, new science finds

Not credible

The Russophile

coronavirus hoax: Fake virus pandemic fabricated to cover-up global outbreak
of 5g syndrome

Not credible

The Russophile

Coronavirus special report: worldwide outbreaks of 5G syndrome and 5G flu
driving pandemic

Not credible

The Liberty Daily

Coronavirus: Chinese espionage behind Wuhan bioweapon?

Not credible

3.2

Respondents

Table 2 overviews how many responses we received for each article type.
Table 2. Summary Statistics of the data
Article topic

Number of responses

Length (avg. words per response)

Climate Change (credible)

194

23.58

Climate Change (false)

183

23.09

Vaccination (credible)

198

21.07

Vaccination (false)

191

21.85

COVID-19 (credible)

142

22.05

COVID-19 (false)

304

28
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The majority of respondents (67%) were between 25 to 44 years old, and nearly 60 percent were male.
Over 75 percent had either an associate degree or a four-year college degree. Respondents indicated that
they primarily consumed news on news websites (42%), social media (28%) and television (25%). Nearly
90 percent of respondents indicated they consumed news daily or multiple times a day. Finally, 60 percent
indicated they sometimes share news on social media compared with 30 percent who indicated they never
shared news on social media and about six percent who always shared.

3.3

Data-quality Assessment

When one uses Amazon Mechanical Turk to collect data, one risks involving respondents that generate lowquality data (Buhrmester et al., 2016; Kennedy et al., 2020). Even though we chose only respondents with
high approval ratings, we needed to first perform an initial data analysis to ensure that we collected reliable
data that we could use for further analysis. In order to assess the data’s reliability, we evaluated it based on
two aspects: 1) the nature of responses at a high level using n-gram analysis (Banko & Vanderwende, 2004;
Yannakoudakis et al., 1990) and 2) the similarity of neural embeddings (Devlin et al., 2018) between the
credible and false articles, which measures the linguistic variations expressed via responses (Carlebach et
al., 2020; Vakulenko et al., 2017).

3.3.1

N-gram Analysis

Researchers have used n-grams extensively to understand the nature of free text (Abidin et al., 2017; Banko
& Vanderwende, 2004; Wressnegger et al., 2013; Zak et al., 2017). An n-gram refers to a contiguous
sequence of n elements from a given text or speech sample. These elements can be letters, words, or base
pairs according to the task at hand. We extracted n-grams from the corresponding news article categories
using the readers’ evaluations. Due to n-grams’ contiguous nature, we could identify important aspects in
the text that readers highlighted as they provided their reasoning for believing a specific article.
Table 2. Article Type and Its Corresponding Tri-, Bi-, and Uni-grams
Article type

Tri-grams

Bi-grams

Uni-grams

Climate change
(credible)

believe-climate-change, climatechange-real, climate-changehappening, article-well-written,
trust-source-information

climate-change, believeclimate, makes-sense,
change-real, carbonemissions, news-source

climate, change, believe,
article, information, seems,
source, think, trust

Climate change
(false)

climate-change-real, climatechange-hoax, global-warmingreal, believe-climate-change,
smart-ai-system

global-warming, climatechange, ai-system, changereal, seems-like, changehoax

believe, article, biased,
climate, global, warming,
seems, change, source

sounds-like-lot, measles-casesnews-source, seems-like,
Vaccination (credible) us, sun-times-reputable, believechicken-pox, measles-cases
people-get

believe, news, article,
people, seems, measles,
would, source, heard

trusted-news-source, smart-aiseems-like, anti-vax, newssystem, source-freedom-bunker,
article, believe-vaccines, fluseems-like-article, trying-sellshots, reads-like
product

article, vaccines, like,
people, believe, seems,
information, know, anti,
claims

Vaccination (false)

news-source, believetrusted-news-source, smart-aiinformation, seems-like, aiCOVID-19 (credible) system, believe-news-article, killssystem, news-article,
elderly-younger
trusted-news, makes-sense
COVID-19 (false)

smart-ai-system, trusted-newssource, already-proven-5g, aisystem-says, article-inaccurateunreliable

ai-system, news-source,
smart-ai, conspiracy-theory,
news-article, never-heard

article, information, news,
seems, believe, source,
know, sense
article, believe, source,
news, 5g, ai, information,
seems

The uni-grams in Table 3 show that, at an aggregated level across all the six different categories, news
readers used vocabulary such as “seem”, “think”, “trust”, “believe”. This terminology reflects respondents’
focus on the task to provide their reasoning about the news articles and indicates that they provided relevant
responses. The bi- and tri-grams highlight the aspects of how individuals used their preexisting beliefs and
experiences to the content that in the article along with their opinions about the article source itself. Overall,
the top n-grams focused on articles’ content (e.g., “global-warming”, “chicken-pox”, “news-source”) and
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reasoning that the respondents provided through using vocabulary such as “seems like”, “makes sense”,
“common sense”, which again demonstrates relevance to the study’s task. From this analysis, we concluded
that we obtained suitable data to examine differences in how consumers reason about news articles under
different contexts.

3.3.2

Neural Embeddings

Before we delved deeper into the empirical analysis, we investigated if the responses we collected showed
any high-level distinctions between justifications for credible and false articles. Current literature on natural
language processing (Řehůřek & Sojka, 2011; Devlin et al., 2018) shows that neural embeddings can
capture both the semantic and syntactic characteristics of sentences in order to find any high-level
distinctions between groups. One extracts this information by representing each sentence in a given corpus
(corpus means the entire dataset that comprises different sentences) as a data point in a vector space.
Research has found this approach highly efficient compared to the traditional bag of words (BOW) (Zhang
et al., 2010) and Term frequency inverse document frequency (TFIDF) (Aizawa, 2003; Yang & Pederson,
1997) models especially when comparing different documents or, in our context, reasoning statements. This
refined approach represents sentences in a vector space and has significant advantages when measuring
two document similarities. We primarily used sentence embeddings extracted using BERT (Devlin et al.,
2018) to convert all the responses to vector format. We then used these vectors to compute distances
between the reasons shared while evaluating credible and false articles in our article set. Since all the
vectors in our dataset are expressed in the same space, we used the Euclidean distance metric, which
measures the regular distance between two points in space (Hossain & Abufardeh, 2019). Please note that
0 bounds this metric at the lower end, which means the minimal distance between any given two points (or
two types of reasoning statements) is 0, which indicates their nearly identical nature.
Figure 1 presents a distance heatmap between each category (Euclidean distance between centroids) in
our dataset. The darker the shade of blue in the cell, the higher the Euclidean distance, which means lower
similarity (in other words: darker shades indicate more semantic and syntactic dissimilarity between two
article categories, while lighter shades indicate more similarity). As one can see, articles with a credible
ground truth attracted similar justifications, but those justifications differed to the justifications for the not
credible articles. This finding indicates that people employ different kinds of reasoning when interacting with
credible versus not credible (false) news.

Figure 1. Heatmap of Distances between the Reasoning Statements

The above preliminary analyses highlight the relevance and quality of the data we collected. It shows that
respondents did not provide abstract responses but that they related to the task we gave them: to reason
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about fake and credible news. In Section 4, we analyze the data and look for insights concerning the
reasoning that news readers employed.

4
4.1

Findings
Agreement with Ground Truth

Before conducting any further analysis, we first split the data into subsets based on whether the respondents
agreed with the article’s ground truth. While we did not initially focus on agreement with ground truth, after
analyzing the results, we found that it would be beneficial to create subsets based on such agreement.
Therefore, we included it in our analysis and elaborate on it in Section 5.
Recall that we asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they believed the article we had them read.
We used this scale to gauge agreement with the ground truth. For example, if a person indicated they
believed an article that we deemed credible, we marked it as agreement. If they indicated they did not
believe an article that we deemed credible, we marked it as disagreement with the ground truth. Of the
1,212 respondents, 534 received credible articles to read, and 75 percent indicated that they believed the
article and, thus, the ground truth. The remaining 25 percent either said they did not believe or were unsure
about believing the article and, hence, disagreed with the ground truth. Of the 1,212 respondents, 678
respondents received false articles to read, and 69 percent indicated they did not believe it and, thus, agreed
with our ground truth. We further examined agreement with the ground truth in the novel news article subset
(the COVID-19 articles). Here, the proportion of respondents who agreed with the credible ground truth was
85 percent compared with 68 percent who agreed with the false ground truth. Hence, at the very high level,
our study shows that people can identify credible articles slightly better than false articles. We explore the
reasoning that the respondents provided next.

4.2

Passive versus Active Tone

We begin our analysis by examining passive versus active tone in the responses, which reflects the two
attitudes of detachment and taking responsibility (Yaffe, 2020). Existing literature states that using a passive
voice signals detachment and not taking responsibility, whereas active voice highlights that the author takes
responsibility (Chan & Maglio, 2020; Yaffe, 2020). Passive forms can fulfill various discursive functions that
might easily go unnoticed at a conscious level or introduce interpretational ambiguity (Baratta, 2009;
Bolinger, 2014). We leveraged these aspects to highlight how responses in different categories represent
the respondents’ mindset and confidence in terms of their reasoning. To do so, we used a popular state-ofthe-art Python library called Spacy (https://spacy.io/) for natural language processing and classified each
response based on whether it predominantly used passive (1) or active (0) voice.
We conducted several tests to examine differences in the responses that used passive versus active voice.
First, we note that, regardless of the topic, ground truth, or agreement with the ground truth, responses
mostly used active voice. We flagged only 19 percent of the responses as passive. Next, we delve deeper
into specific differences between subsets of our data, which we show in Table 4.
Table 4. Tests for Differences in the Proportion of Passive versus Active Voice
Statistical
Analysis

Test

Proportion of
passive voice

Z test for
proportions

Comparisons

Ppassive1

Ppassive2

Sig.

False vs. credible

0.226

0.159

0.0018

Common vs. novel

0.179

0.227

0.0214

Agree vs. disagree
with ground truth

0.196

0.206

ns

Since our analysis generated a classification variable (0 for active and 1 for passive), it focused on proportion
tests. We conducted paired proportions tests on three key data splits:
1)

The proportion of passive voice that respondents used to reason about false versus credible
articles. We found that they used passive voice proportionally more when reasoning about the
false articles (significant at the 0.01 level).
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2)

The proportion of passive voice that respondents used to reason about common versus novel
articles. We found that they used passive voice proportionally more when reasoning about the
novel articles (significant at the 0.05 level).

3)

The proportion of passive voice that the respondents used to reason about when they agreed
versus when they disagreed with the ground truth (we note here that respondents did not know
our ground truth judgement: we simply presented them with the articles and later computed the
agreement). We found no significant difference for this test.

We found further support for these results from conducting a chi square goodness-of-fit test in which we
compared the distribution of the proportion of responses to each of four categories—believe credible articles
(agree with ground truth), disbelieve credible articles (disagree with ground truth), believe false articles
(disagree), and disbelieve false articles (agree)—with the proportion of passive voice use for the same
categories. We did not find significantly different distributions.
Returning to the literature, we know that respondents may leverage passive text when they do not want to
take responsibility and when the article makes ambiguous claims that make it difficult for readers to interpret
and take a clear stance (Baratta, 2009; Bolinger 2014; Yaffe, 2020). Thus, our findings show a greater lack
of clarity when respondents interact with false news and when they interact with novel news topics.

4.3

Psycholinguistic Emotions and News Articles

Next, we use the psycholinguistic lexicon LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2001) to examine how emotional
attributes are associated with different news article categories. LIWC generates 69 preset output variables
that include linguistic dimensions (e.g., pronouns, articles, and verbs), psychological processes (e.g., affect
and cognition), personal concern categories (e.g., work, home, leisure activities), and more. In the
psychological processes, specific attributes are associated with different emotional categories. For example,
positive and negative emotions, anger, or sadness are all associated with affective processes; family and
friends are associated with social processes; insight, certainty, and differentiation are associated with the
cognitive process; and so on. Despite this hierarchy, LIWC scores both lower- and higher-level categories
based on the dictionary.
We used LIWC2015 to run the analysis on the 1,212 responses that we received. After we received the
scores for each response, we used two subsets and two different hypothesis tests to focus on the more
interesting insights. Specifically, as we mention above, we split the data based on agreement with the
ground truth. After doing so, we ran two different t-tests for each data subset. The first compared the average
LIWC scores for credible versus false articles, and the second compared the average LIWC scores for
common versus novel articles. We show the results in Tables 5 to 8, respectively. Due to space limitations,
we only show the significant categories in each table.
Table 5. LIWC Scores and Comparison Tests for Reasoning on False versus Credible Articles
(Respondents who Agreed with the Ground Truth)
Category

Examples

t

p-value

μfalse

μcredible

Affective processes

happy, cried

2.222

0.027

4.904

4.060

Negative emotion

hurt, ugly, nasty

5.490

0.000

1.983

0.863

Anger

hate, kill, annoyed

3.765

0.000

0.783

0.271

Family

daughter, dad, aunt

-2.171

0.031

0.000

0.050

Insight

think, know

-5.317

0.000

5.149

7.697

Causation

because, effect

-3.263

0.001

3.669

4.895

Differentiation

hasn't, but, else

5.425

0.000

4.413

2.594

Biological processes

eat, blood, pain

5.232

0.000

1.471

0.575

Health

clinic, flu, pill

6.169

0.000

1.291

0.346

Affiliation

ally, friend, social

-2.008

0.045

0.377

0.629

Achievement

win, success, better

2.489

0.013

0.678

0.398

Power

superior, bully

-1.923

0.055

1.198

1.615

Reward

take, prize, benefit

-2.010

0.045

0.460

0.769
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Table 5. LIWC Scores and Comparison Tests for Reasoning on False versus Credible Articles
(Respondents who Agreed with the Ground Truth)
Past focus

ago, did, talked

-2.180

0.030

2.988

3.735

Relativity

area, bend, exit

-3.973

0.000

6.676

8.716

Motion

arrive, car, go

-3.888

0.000

0.847

1.646

Time

end, until, season

-3.255

0.001

1.616

2.465

Leisure

cook, chat, movie

-2.166

0.031

0.093

0.247

Nonfluencies

er, hm, umm

-2.639

0.009

0.049

0.260

Table 6. LIWC Scores and Comparison Tests for Reasoning on False versus Credible articles
(Respondents who Disagreed with the Ground Truth)
Category

Examples

t

p-value

μfalse

μcredible

Affective processes

happy, cried

1.730

0.085

5.350

4.247

Positive emotion

love, nice, sweet

2.440

0.015

3.782

2.562

Social Processes

mate, talk, they

-1.885

0.061

4.545

5.993

Health

clinic, flu, pill

4.992

0.000

1.392

0.212

Reward

take, prize, benefit

3.592

0.000

1.183

0.397

Present focus

today, is, now

-2.319

0.021

15.271

17.573

Relativity

area, bend, exit

-1.868

0.063

6.888

8.559

Motion

arrive, car, go

-2.105

0.037

0.830

1.590

Time

end, until, season

-2.649

0.009

1.674

2.801

Leisure

cook, chat, movie

-1.690

0.093

0.031

0.132

Assent

agree, OK, yes

1.839

0.067

0.171

0.039

Table 7. LIWC Scores and Comparison Tests for Reasoning on Common versus Novel Articles
(Respondents who Agreed with the Ground Truth)
Category

Examples

t

p-value

μcommon

μnovel

Anxiety

worried, fearful

-1.770

0.077

0.167

0.319

Social processes

mate, talk, they

3.836

0.000

5.829

4.221

Family

daughter, dad, aunt

2.169

0.031

0.038

0.000

Male references

boy, his, dad

3.919

0.000

0.272

0.000

Causation

because, effect

4.526

0.000

4.848

3.291

Discrepancy

should, would

-3.708

0.000

0.692

1.359

Tentative

maybe, perhaps

-2.945

0.003

4.095

5.293

Certainty

always, never

-1.899

0.058

2.590

3.182

Biological processes

eat, blood, pain

-3.027

0.003

0.829

1.399

Health

clinic, flu, pill

-2.921

0.004

0.653

1.152

Affiliation

ally, friend, social

2.751

0.006

0.617

0.303

Work

job, majors, xerox

1.766

0.078

2.368

1.859

Money

audit, cash, owe

2.206

0.028

0.238

0.083

Religion

altar, church

2.742

0.006

0.189

0.025
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Table 8. LIWC Scores and Comparison Tests for Reasoning on Common versus Novel Articles (Respondents
who Disagreed with the Ground Truth)
Category

Examples

t

p-value

μcommon

μnovel

Affective processes

happy, cried

1.739

0.083

5.300

4.210

Feel

feels, touch

2.333

0.020

0.701

0.278

Biological processes

eat, blood, pain

-3.186

0.002

0.701

1.964

Health

clinic, flu, pill

-3.453

0.001

0.524

1.850

Motion

arrive, car, go

2.281

0.023

1.328

0.661

Religion

altar, church

1.755

0.081

0.110

0.000

Informal language

na

2.021

0.044

0.426

0.170

Each table shows the significant (or borderline significant) LIWC categories that emerged from the analysis
along with word examples from the LIWC2015 dictionary. The t scores and p-values come from independent
samples’ t-tests using the raw LIWC scores for each person in each subset and comparing credible versus
false article responses (Table 5) and common versus novel article responses (Table 6). The mean values
in the tables are the average values for each response in each category and represent the percentage of
total words for that category in the written response. The higher the value, the more prominent the category
in the response sentence. To reduce noise in our results, we also ran the LIWC analysis on the original
article set. For example, categories such as health and biological processes, motion, drives, and work
appeared prominently in the articles themselves, which might explain their prominence in the responses. In
our discussion, we focus on the significant and prominent categories (high mean values) in the responses
and that did not strongly link to the article text.
A first finding concerns the affective processes. Regardless of whether respondents agreed with the ground
truth or not, affective processes appeared significantly in respondents who reasoned about false versus
credible news (Tables 5 and 6). But whereas negative emotions and anger appeared more prominently
among respondents who reasoned about false news articles and who correctly identified them as false
(Table 5), positive emotions appeared more prominently among respondents who reasoned about false
articles and did not identify them as such (Table 6). This emotional reasoning might indicate some level of
ideological alignment with the provided justification and the use of motivated reasoning by respondents. We
expand on this point later in the text.
Next, insight, causation, and differentiation all constitute cognitive processes. While insight and causation
had a higher mean for credible article responses in Table 5, differentiation had a higher mean for false
articles. Interestingly, none of these cognitive reasoning processes appear in Table 6, which represent the
respondents who disagreed with the ground truth. This finding lends support to arguments that people might
fall for false news due to a lack of cognitive reasoning.
Social processes, while not greatly prominent in the data, did have a borderline significant difference among
respondents who did not agree with the ground truth. These respondents used social processes to support
disagreement with credible articles (higher mean for the credible articles in Table 6). Future research could
explore this interesting finding with a study design that emphasized social processes more than our study
did.
Finally, the temporal focus of responses changes from past to present as we move from Table 5 to Table
6. However, both are more strongly associated with reasoning concerning credible news, so we interpret it
as an artifact of the response style when one agrees versus disagrees with a given claim and not necessarily
tied to reasoning on fake news per se.
Moving to Tables 7 and 8, we can see that correctly reasoning on novel news tends to be more tentative
and cautious, which represents the uncertainty that exists around novel news topics. We also can see that
social processes play a stronger role in common news, which indicates reasoning about these topics may
rely on prior social experiences or with the opinions of social contacts.
Interestingly, Table 8 shows that affective processes were again significant among those respondents who
disagreed with the ground truth but that they expressed negative emotions (albeit not significant in our tests).
Taken with our previous insight, this finding shows that emotions play a role in how people read and process
news articles. Moreover, if we consider Kahan’s (2013) argument for motivated reasoning based on
partisanship, we can link negative emotion toward COVID-19 and positive emotion toward articles that
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object to vaccinations and climate change arguments as being affiliated with a particular opinion group.
Hence, this evidence lends support to assertion that specific respondent groups used motivated reasoning.

5

Discussion

With a rich data set that contained news consumers’ veracity decisions, we employed multiple linguistic
tools to better understand how news readers reason about the articles that they read. We examined the
differences in reasoning for credible versus false news and for novel versus common news topics.
Framing our work in the prior literature that has argued for both ideologically motivated and cognitive
analytical reasoning, we looked for textual clues in responses to understand what reasoning respondents
employed under each context. We found that respondents reasoned differently about false versus credible
news in general with more nuanced insights stemming from breaking our sample into those who agreed
with the ground truth (i.e., correctly identified false and credible news) versus those who disagreed.
At the high analysis level, looking at how respondents used passive tone in reasoning about false versus
credible news, we found that, regardless of agreement with the ground truth, people used more passive
tone when reasoning about false news than when reasoning about credible news. Therefore, we propose
that:
P1: Compared to reasoning about credible news, reasoning about false news involves more passive
voice, which reflects greater ambiguity and a more distant attitude.
Examining our results further and separating the data based on agreement with the ground truth, we found
that respondents who correctly identified articles’ ground truth relied on several cognitive processes. We
found as much for both common and novel topics, although respondents displayed a more tentative
approach to reasoning about novel news. While they expressed some affect, emotions played a lesser part
in their reasoning and were mostly attached to false, rather than credible, news. Respondents who did not
agree with the article’s ground truth, on the other hand, relied more heavily on affective and social
processes, which indicates that political affiliation might have driven the specific emotions they expressed.
Cognitive processes did not significantly differ for respondents who disagreed with the article’s ground truth
neither in the credible/false analysis nor in the common/novel analysis. Taken together, these findings
explain why the literature provides evidence both ways (for cognitive and motivated reasoning) and also
suggests that emotional and social reasoning have a dominant role in why people disagree with ground
truth, whereas cognitive reasoning is associated with people correctly judging news articles. This finding
has important implications for designing tools to help mitigate fake news from spreading since one should
target different reasoning among users. Thus, we propose that:
P2: Agreement with articles’ ground truth is more strongly associated with cognitive reasoning and,
to a lesser extent with emotional and social reasoning, whereas disagreement with articles’
ground truth is more strongly associated with emotional and social reasoning.
In this study, we also explored news topic novelty as a potential contingency for reasoning style. Past
research has tied novelty to information overload and uncertainty, and, in this work, we found support for
the latter via analyzing passive versus active voice in the reasoning that respondents provided. Specifically,
we found that people use more passive voice to reason about novel versus common news topics. Thus, we
propose that:
P3: Compared to reasoning about common news, reasoning on novel news involves more passive
voice, which reflects greater ambiguity and a more distant attitude.
While we did not find strong support to propose a direct effect of novelty on reasoning styles through our
linguistic analysis, we do see a potential moderation effect in that news topic novelty changes the magnitude
of specific emotions and social process. Thus, we propose that:
P4: A news topic’s novelty does not change the dynamic between cognitive, emotional, and social
reasoning but it weakens their effect likely due to uncertainty.

5.1

Implications for HCI and Interventions Design

With this paper, we open a dialogue in the information systems, psychology, and journalism research
communities about the role that reasoning plays in decisions about news’ veracity and how those reasonings
can inform automated interventions. Specifically, we focus on whether one can design tailored support for
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decision making about news’ veracity. Below, we return to discussing existing tools that can help one detect
and mitigate fake news. Given our findings, we also discuss HCI and design implications related to
developing automated intervention tools and technologies for cognitive self-reflection. Note that we focus
on fake news but do not make any distinctions here between misinformation or disinformation.
Broadly, the literature has suggested three approaches to automatic or semi-automatic interventions: 1)
reducing the visibility of unreliable information (filtering, de-recommending, banning producers, etc.), 2)
placing a warning label on unreliable information as one shows it to a consumer, and 3) educating
information consumers to better evaluate misleading information. Our findings shed light on potential
improvements in these three approaches.
First, current approaches treat all consumers as the same and view one type of intervention as suitable for
everyone (e.g., Twitter’s warning label system as of 2021). However, our findings demonstrate that this
approach may not be the most effective one. Furthermore, the past literature on cognitive biases (e.g., see
Table 9) has clearly demonstrated that different people will interpret interventions differently. Eliciting
consumers’ different biases or other philosophical or ideological traits in future studies may provide more
granular results than what we can conclude. For example, personal outlooks on specific topics, related past
experiences, and ideological leaning may all play a role in the effectiveness of interventions and the
reasoning behind belief decisions. In future studies, one could measure these individual differences through
both implicit and explicit survey questions. For instance, one could use policy-based political questions or
questions related to sociopolitical events to validate self-reported political leanings (e.g., see Horne et al.
2019) in order to capture both explicit and implicit measures of a single individual trait.
Second, warning label systems that one tailors to the consumer may increase the effectiveness of
automated and semi-automated interventions. Our study highlights that past shared content plays a critical
role here. Using past reasoning to learn about biases (such as the ones in Table 9) may improve intervention
designs. For example, using consumers’ previous agreement or disagreement with fact-checked information
(using previous shares as a proxy) may approximate their typical reasoning and reveal any confirmation
bias or valence effect. As such, it could allow one to use different types of warning labels. Again, as we state
above, other individual traits besides interactions with past content may provide further insights into effective
warning label design. Such traits could include ideological positions, personality traits, philosophical
outlooks, or policy positions. One could theoretically indirectly measure these traits through a news reader’s
online activity. However, eliciting those traits opens these technical solutions to many ethical issues that
one should carefully consider and may open these solutions to an array of privacy issues that may do more
harm than good. Finally, while a fact check may work for someone using cognitive reasoning, that same
fact check might not impact a person who has mainly relies on emotional and social processes. Although
one would need to carefully implement and explicitly test the specific change in warning label design using
this approach, other works support this notion. Specifically, Horne et al. (2020) and Pennycook et al. (2020)
both suggest that warning labels besides explicit fact checking can be effective.
One can broadly apply a similar logic to various debunking and prebunking methods. Debunking and
prebunking provide corrections to misinformation with help from technology. However, a correction may
leave an inconsistency in one's memory or may cause the incorrect information to be more fluent. One
needs to understand how the individual reasons before delivering a correction to avoid negative side effects.
For example, providing a cognitive correction to a predominantly emotional thinker might lead to resistance
towards receiving the advice. Alternatively, providing a correction for someone with overconfidence in their
beliefs might result in lower impact. Again, knowing how users might receive information represents a
powerful design tool for AI interventions.
Furthermore, while news item novelty had only a small effect on reasoning, predicting when a situation is
novel or during events with high uncertainty (e.g., crisis events) may allow warning labels in general to be
more effective. We leave it to future work to clearly define and understand what constitutes “novel enough”
to reap these intervention benefits.
Third, increasing news literacy through technologies for self-reflection can be a foundation to educate users
about detecting fake news. Indeed, our results show the prevalence of passive voice in reasoning about
false news and novel news topics, which indicates uncertainty and insufficient knowledge to enable accurate
assessment. By using similar methods as we used to characterize how readers reason about news articles,
we believe that online platforms can provide individuals with additional capabilities for cognitive selfreflection. These capabilities could add to intervention approaches that focus on educating news
consumers. For example, if one elicited consumers’ reasoning, one could use automated approaches, such
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as the ones we used in this study, to determine reasoning type (cognitive or motivated). Then, similar to
shifting one’s attention to certain information’s accuracy (Pennycook et al., 2020), interventions can shift
consumer attention to their own reasoning, which can allow them to self-reflect and potentially increase their
future ability to make correct veracity decisions. Again, just as with the previously discussed method, one
should explicitly test this approach, which we leave for future work.
Table 9. Theories of Cognitive Biases
Bias

Definition (emphasis added)

Overconfidence effect
(Dunning et al., 1990)

“When an individual’s subjective confidence in their judgements is higher than the
objective accuracy of the judgements, it will be considered as overconfidence effect.”

Social desirability bias
(Fisher, 1993)

“Respondents are often unwilling or unable to report accurately on sensitive topics for
ego-defensive or impression management reasons. The result is data that are
systematically biased toward respondents’ perceptions of what is ‘correct’ or
socially acceptable and is considered as social desirability bias.”

Selective exposure
(Freedman & Sears, 1965)

“People are exposed to disproportionate amounts of supportive information, and it is
extremely difficult to alter the beliefs of people holding clear opinions.”
During this process, individuals voluntarily avoid contradictory information that leads to
selective exposure bias.

Valence effect (Frijda et al., Valence effect emerges when “individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood of
1986)
good things happening rather than negative things.”
Contrast effect (Hovland et
al., 1957)

Contrast effect is an “unconscious bias that happens when two entities are judged
based on their differences in comparison to other instead of evaluating them
individually.”

Prospect theory focuses on “determining how individuals assess their loss and
Prospect theory (Kahneman
gain perspectives in relation to their specific situation rather than in absolute
& Tversky, 2013)
terms”.
Confirmation bias
(Nickerson, 1998)

5.2

Confirmation bias refers to the “inclination to look for, interpret or favor
information in such a way that aligns with one’s prior beliefs and values”.

Limitations and Future Work

As with all studies, this study has several limitations. First, the data set that we considered in this research
pertained specifically to the chosen news context. Different news topics and context could change the
reasonings that news consumers use. We also did not conduct specific manipulation tests to check whether
respondents perceived COVID as a novel news topic. However, based on the results, we believe that these
articles provided a sufficient basis to investigate different linguistic cues that reflect consumer reasoning
and that our findings have some general implications. Second, we may have had a low number of data
points (consumer responses) compared to the usual data set sizes that researchers have used in
quantitative, natural language processing analyses. However, given the relative uniformity among the
number of responses (which the neural sentence similarity heatmap in Figure 1 shows), we argue that we
obtained valid insights that do not suffer from any visible biases even given the limited number of responses.
Furthermore, we obtained a relatively large number of data points compared to usual human or crowdsourced experiments.
In this study, we opted for an exploratory study given the lack of direct theoretical guidance on this topic.
Future work can start with the propositions that we put forth in this paper and design confirmatory,
experimental studies to test them further. Finally, in addition to the future directions that we mention above,
we would like to delve deeper into differences across demographics and pre-existing beliefs to investigate
individuals’ reasoning and sense-making strategies about news articles. To do so robustly, we would like to
experiment across wider news contexts and events.
Lastly, our linguistic-based analysis both in the data-quality assessment and in the psycholinguistic
assessment may have some alternative explanations. First, while we found in our data-quality assessment
that open-ended responses related to the general task, the differences between groups may not have arose
due to the type of article that the respondents assessed but rather a more general difference between the
words they used when justifying a true or false position. However, this data-quality assessment only
constitutes an additional step to ensure robustness. Given the steps that we took in designing our study and
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using standard AMT quality controls, we have confidence in the data’s quality. Second, while researchers
have studied LIWC for psycholinguistic analysis, latent factors that we did not measure in our analysis may
explain the significant differences between groups. Yet, we did control for LIWC’s most obvious shortcoming
in our analysis; namely, topic-specific word usage. Specifically, we measured the LIWC categories on the
news articles themselves to find groups of words that participants may have used simply due to the topic
that they assess (e.g., health and biological processes). Given this control, we have confidence in our
statistical results, although some alternative for the found differences may exist as we could not establish a
causal connection.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we highlight the distinct linguistic cues latently present in the syntax, language, and semantics
extracted from the news readers’ responses on labeling false versus credible news articles. Some
interesting insights from this research include: 1) reasoning for false news and for novel news topics involves
a more passive tone that indicates uncertainty, 2) news readers employ both cognitive and motivated
reasoning processes, and topic novelty moderates (weakens) the effect of cognitive and emotional
reasoning, and 3) social processes deserve further investigation as they appear in some reasoning that
respondents employed.
Using these insights, we also highlight the different design implications across three broadly used
approaches to information veracity interventions. We hope that our approach and findings can influence
efforts to design new technological interventions that leverage consumer reasoning to tailor more effective
interventions and serve as a stepping-stone for continued work in this area.
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